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VOLUME V

NUMBER 1

Whether the plaintiff should be allowed to discover insurance facts
of the defendant under Rule 26 (b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure is a question that rarely fails to raise heated arguments between
plaintiff and defense attorneys. Mr. Wilkerson, a well known plaintiff's
attorney, presents in an advocate's style, new and interesting insights
(including recent case trends and a poll of Wyoming judges) into the
argument that Rule 26 (b) should be expanded. He also provides the
reader the amendment of Rule 26 (b) now being offered by the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee.

RULE 26- THEaPROCRUSTEAN BED
Ernest Wilkerson*
T E PjoposlmoN

P

should be allowed to discover or obtain under
Rule 26 (b):'
LAINTIFT

1. The existence or non-existence of defendant's liability

insurance;
2. The policy limits of the defendant's insurance policy;

3. Any policy defenses which the insuror asserts of which
the insured has knowledge;
4. The delivery of the complete contract of insurance to-

gether with any riders.
THE LAW IN WYOMING

During October, 1969, 1 polled the Wyoming State District Judges on the question of whether they did or did not alAttorney at Law, Casper, Wyoming; B.A., University of Wyoming; LL.B.,
Yale Law School; member of Wyoming and American Bar Associations.
Mr. Wilkerson has the distinct honor of being the youngest person to ever
win the American Bar Association Ross Essay Contest.
1. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
*
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low discovery of liability insurance limits under Rule 26 (b).'
Interestingly and perhaps predictably, there is no unanimity
of opinion among them. There are twelve State District
Judges. Of the twelve, nine responded; of those who responded three permit such discovery, one refuses it. The remaining
jurists have not been called upon to pass on the question. This
latter fact reflects no credit on the plaintiffs' Bar since some
of the judges before whom the question has never been raised
have been on the bench for several years.
The United States District Court for Wyoming has traditionally never permitted such discovery under Rule 26 (b).
Tenth Circuit judges in other Federal Courts are split on the
question.
None of the judges indicated that he was considering
changing his present interpretation of Rule 26 (b) to, in effect,
reverse himself on this question. One of the newer judges to
whom the question had not yet been presented, made the apt
observation that he felt that he would likely permit such discovery under the philosophy of the rules as enunciated by
Rule 1, W.R.C.P., which declares that all rules shall be construed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
Another offered:
I can see no possible harm or prejudice to an insurance company which results from the revelation of the
amount and terms of the policy. I know there are
arguments about this, but I am talking about a substantial prejudice rather than a lawyer's irritation.
I can conversely see where the revelation of the
limits may be of real advantage to the insured, as
2. The poll was carried out in the form of a letter which read as follows:
:
Dear Judge .................-I have been asked by the Land and Water Law Review to submit an
article for publication. I have chosen for my subject "The Discoverability under Rule 26 or otherwise of the Existence and Policy Limits
of Liability Insurance," my general theme being that both as a matter
of justice and administrative expedition, such should be discoverable in
any case.
I would appreciate you and your fellow Judges advising me for the
purpose of background for the article:
1. Do you allow plaintiffs to discover insurance and policy limits
under Rule 26?
2. Do you have any particular attitude or philosophy about this
either way which might be helpful in preparing the article?
I shall not attribute your remarks without your permission.
Thank you for your help.
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plaintiff's attorneys are interested in cash, and if
they know the cash limit, a settlement is much more
apt to ensue. I am thinking of a young man just
starting life who might have such an accident with a
minimum coverage, and say a $20,000 judgment with
a $10,000 pay off, certainly the pending judgment
would not be of much help to the young man in
starting a business. I am somewhat embarassed that
these are more gut reactions than statements of law,
but I do think they are basic philosophies in connection with this question which are worthy of consideration.
But contra:
The contract of the insurance company is to defend
and if necessary to pay a judgment. That contract
is with the assured and not with a prospective claimant. I suppose the insurance company does not want
its presence known, or if the coverage is large, to encourage the seeking of even larger judgments in an
area in which claims more frequently run to excess
rather than to moderation or reasonbleness. But
whatever their reasons, it would seem in the traditional sense, to be a matter strictly between the insurance
companies and their assured, but not with the Court
or opposing counsel, at least until the matter reaches
judgment.
Another judge who requires the disclosure says: "My particular attitude or philosophy about this is that it tends to
bring about settlement and tends to bring about at the pretrial a more realistic approach as to what the lawsuit is worth
and opens the matter for discussion at the pretrial."
Generally the judges who permit the discovery do so for
the primary reason that in their view it leads to settlement of
lawsuits. We will discuss this later.
So far as I know there have been no Wyoming State or
Federal court cases dealing with the subject of whether or
not the insurance existence and limits are discoverable in this
state. The Wyoming case of Ulrich v. Ulrich,' however, discussed in the context of submitted interrogatories the question
of whether interrogatories could be used to elicit a legal
opinion of the opponent as to the effect of a property settle3. 366 P.2d 999 (Wyo. 1961).
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ment agreement. Justice Harnsberger, speaking for the court,
held that such was not discoverable saying:
Although a proper interpretation of Rule 26 (b) and
Rule 33, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, admits
of a great latitude in the examination of a party by
interrogatory, that privilege is not without its limitations. If the answer to a question may lead to the discovery of evidence or enlighten as to some phase of
the issues, the interrogatory is permissible. It is as
true that interrogatory may be used to obtain admission as to a relevant fact, but this does not extend to
its use to elicit an expression of opinion as to existence of what may become a fact only by virtue of a
correct legal conclusion.'
This case, which reiterates familiar language which has
been said in different ways many times, is probably not greatly
helpful in determining the scope or discovery under Rule 26
(b) in Wyoming. Talking about Rule 26 at all, in fact, might
have been a bit of judicial overkill. Obviously a question
asking a witness his opinion as to the legal effect of a contract
is objectionable completely apart from Rule 26 (b). The contract speaks for itself, the court is the arbiter of what it means.
In the slightly earlier Wyoming case of Barber v. State
Highway Commission,' which was a condemnation case, the
Wyoming Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Parker said: under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the
bar and bench of this State are dedicated to a full and fair
disclosure of all the facts in a case at or prior to the time of
trial, with no withholding of certain matters to be used as
secret weapons.'
Insofar, thus, as the Wyoming Supreme Court has spoken
about Rule 26 (b), it has spoken essentially truistically.
THE ARGUMENT

It is my belief that both as a matter of expedition and as
a matter of justice, Rule 26 (b) should be interpreted to permit the discovery in the four areas indicated above. Based
partly on the comments of judges, partly on the exchange of
4. Id. at 1001.
5. 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723 (1959).
6. Id. at 726.
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anecdotes with other lawyers and partly on personal experience, I think it surely must be said (and can be said safely)
that plaintiff's knowledge of the insurance coverage which is
available to the defendant is a very strong factor in the submission of a settlement offer to settle the case at an early stage.
There are various reasons for this, of course. One among
them, which is perhaps irrelevant to more abstract concepts
of justice for the client, is the fact that the lawycr hihnself
makes his living out of his processing of lawsuits. Normally,
until his client gets paid in personal injury litigation, he
doesn't get paid. His interest, thus, is coincident with that
of his client in obtaining a rapid termination of his client's
claim.
Personal injury lawyers, generally, are sufficiently experienced and skilled to have a pretty realistic idea of what a
given lawsuit is worth in terms of what a jury is likely to
award if the case is tried. Though at times we nod. For example, a personal injury case within the writer's knowledge
was offered for settlement before trial at $60,000.00 which was
within the policy limits. No insurance company settlement
offer was received at all nor were the policy limits known to
plaintiff. The plaintiff ultimately recoverd $204,000 of
which only $100,000 was covered by insurance, the insured paying the balance himself. It seems likely in this case that a full
and fair knowledge of the policy limits, together with a more
realistic appraisal of the case by the insurance company might
have effected a settlement which would would have been beneficial to the insurance company, and emphatically to its insured.
We may say, thus, for the sake of argument at least, that
the least important consideration, that is the attorney's own interest in rapid processing of tort claims, is best served if he
knows what the resources are that are available to satisfy a
jury verdict if one is obtained.
The basic problem, I believe, in trying to mesh Rule 26 (b)
and insurance revelation is that in determining whether insurance coverage should be permissibly discovered under 26
(b), we are trying to put the traditional square peg in the
round hole. We are guilty of a conceptual rigidity which
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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doesn't allow us to see this. Whether or not insurance coverage should be made known to a plaintiff is a completely different question in a completely different area from the problem
of discovery measured in terms of production of admissible
evidence at a trial. No one proposes that the existence and
amount of insurance should be made available to a jury in
determining the question of alleged negligence of the insured.
Thus, when we try to discuss whether or not the information
should be given and try to discuss it within the framework
of Rule 26 (b), we are starting out with an impossible situation. The judges who have adopted what is submitted to be
the more enlightened viewpoint have simply had to step outside the framework of Rule 26 (b) and as indicated above, find
refuge in Rule 1 or otherwise, to permit the discovery of information which obviously is not "calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."
One of our problems, thus, in evaluating this is a semantic
problem. Another problem is that of the overly easy analogy.
To illustrate: The United States District Court of Tennessee
in the case of Hillman v. Penny:
If insurance can be discovered, then logically it
should follow that all assets which may be available
to satisfy any judgment should likewise be discoverable. The basic issue is therefore whether the resources of the defendant should be fully disclosed
upon discovery in an automobile accident case prior
to judicial determination of liability or damages. It
seems to the Court that not only is such inquiry going
considerable astray from the issues of liability and
damages, but that the plaintiff's interests in and
reasons for acquiring this information are considerably outweighed by the defendant's right to privacy
and right to refrain from disclosing his confidential
affairs until such time as such disclosure may be relevant or necessary in the interests of justice. It seems
to the court that the interpretation contended for by
the plaintiff would unduly invade the right of privacy
prior to a determination of any liability. A groundless claim might then become the vehicle for making
full inquiry into all of the confidential financial affairs of any luckless defendant involved in an automobile accident. It is more reasonable to believe that
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/10
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such a result was not contemplated in the drafting
and adoption of the rules. The right to individual
privacy is of necessity being curtailed and reduced
with the growth of the population and government in
general. The courts should not unnecessarily contribute to this process. This court does not believe that
even a liberal interpretation of Rule 26 (b) F.R.C.P.,
requires any different result.'
And again from our sister state to the north in the case of
State ex. rel., Hersman v. District Court:
In our view, the resources of a defendant in a negligence action are not germane before a judicial determination of liability and assessment of damages. We
think to hold otherwise constitutes an invasion of privacy and a delving into the confidential affairs of a
defendant which is neither relevant nor necessary to
determine any issue in the litigation, prior to entry
of judgment.'
The fallacy, of course, of this kind of judicial oversimplification should be quickly apparent. The right of an insured
to indemnity against judgments under a liability insurance
policy which he has bought is a different kind of asset from
any other asset he has for two elemental reasons:
1. The asset becomes such only when vitalized by a judge
ment against him for his negligence, and
2. The asset was acquired precisely against the possibility
of a contingency occuring: that is, his being found liable for
damages inflicted by him on a third party.
No other asset that he owns, not his house, not his stocks
or bonds, nor the cash value of his life insurance, nor his
jewelry nor his car was bought by him for the express purpose of satisfying a judgment against him (for which reason
he purchased liability insurance). Accordingly, let us discard
this particular faulty analogy because it is imprecise and fuzzy
legal thinking to say that if you will require a defendant to
disclose the value of his liability insurance, you will logically
have to compel him to disclose the value of his other assets.
This leads us to the question: why does a person acquire
liability insurance in the first instance ? Let us talk about
7. 29 F.R.D. 159, 161 (Tenn. 1962).
8. 142 Mont. 139, 881 P.2d 799, 801 (1963).
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public liability and property damage insurance as being the
most important and as being generically the kind of insurance
we are talking about. Most states require public liability and
property damage insurance at either one of two stages from
drivers. Some states (for example, Massachusetts) require
that a driver must submit a certificate of insurance before he
can be issued a license to drive. Other states (for example,
Wyoming) require no evidence of insurance in order to be issued a license to drive but should the driver have an accident
with attendant incipient liability, then the driver must establish that he has insurance in required amounts (or establish financial responsibility by other means or secure a
release) failing in which he will lose his license to drive. In
the latter class of states, the great bulk of drivers secure liability insurance as a matter of course and only a small number
rely upon luck in avoiding accidents or their own personal
assets to be able to establish financial responsibility.
Why, then, does one who wants to drive an automobile
secure insurance against his negligent harm to the person or
property of others? He does it for three reasons: First, the
law either directly or in effect requires that he have insurance.
Second, he wants to protect himself and his assets from
the potential impact of a personal injury or property damage
claim against him.
Third, he is creating a fund for the benefit of the person
whom he injures because the state has determined as a matter
of policy that such a fund shall be available to compensate
persons injured by the negligence of others.
If, then, one of the reasons for entering into the insurance
contract is the protection of a third party, why should not the
protected third party be able to know the terms of the contract
created for his benefit? The concept of third party beneficiaries under and to contracts is well established. The fact
that an injured party may proceed against an insuror under
his contract with his insured following adjudication of liability is well established as is the concept that the third injured
party has rights as such under it. 9 It is submitted, thus, that
laying aside the stylized strictures of Rule 26 (b) an injured
9. Phoenix Assurance Company v. Latta, 373 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1960).
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party should be able to secure possession of a copy of the insurance contract between the person who injured him and the injuring party's insurance company entered into for his benefit.
Essentially what we are saying here again is that dealing
with the matter of revelation of insurance policy limits within
the framework of Rule 26 (b) is simply unrealistic. What we
must do is to acknowledge that independent of this "evidentiary" rule, it is good public policy to have full disclosure of
the contents of the liability insurance policy and this policy
need not be tied to any other policy or principal but will stand
on its own. The proposed change in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure properly adopt this approach. As reported by
Judge Roszel Thomson at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, July 1, 1967, and as reprinted in the Insurance Counsel
Journal," the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules has
proposed amendments which are now receiving consideration
by the United States Supreme Court and which it is believed
will be adopted. Judge Thomson in commenting on the proposed amendment to Rule 26 (b) says this:
One important change deals with the discovery of insurance coverage. Both the cases and the commentators are sharply in conflict on the question whether
a defendant's liability insurance coverage is subject
to discovery in the usual situatiion when such coverage is not itself admissible in evidence and does not
bear on some other issue in the case.
The proposed amendment resolves that issue in favor
of disclosure. Most of the courts denying discovery
have felt themselves bound by the provision of the
Rules that permits discovery only of matters which
will be admissible in evidence or appear reasonably
calculated to lead to such evidence. The cases favoring disclosure rely heavily on the practical significance of insurance in the decisions which lawyers
make about settlement and trial preparation.
The Committee believes that disclosure of insurance
coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make
the same realistic appraisal of the case; it will lead
to settlement in some cases and will avoid protracted
litigation in others. The amendment is limited to insurance or indemnity coverage, as distinguished from
10. Thomson, Proposed Changes In The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35
INS. COUNSEL J. 290 (1968).
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any other facts concerning defendant's financial
status; first, because insurance is an asset created
specifically to satisfy the claim; second, because the
insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation;
third, because information about it is available only
from defendant or his insurer.
Disclosure will not make the insurance coverage admissible in evidence.1 1
States in our area which have decided the question of insurance limits discovery within the last few years include in
favor of allowance, California and Utah; against allowance,
Montana and Arizona. This division of authority in the Western area is typical of the situation throughout the nation.1"
As the judge observed in the case of Wood v. Todd Shipyards:
Very few questions involving discovery are as unsettled as is the discoverability of the defendant's liability insurance.' The decisions of the Federal District Courts are divided on this point. Many of them
allow such discovery.2 Many do not.' Commentators
are also divided on whether or not insurance can be
discovered.4
1. 2A Barron and Holtzoff § 647.1 (Wright ed. 1961).
2. Vetter v. Lovett, 44 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Tex. 1968); Woldum v.
Roverud Construction, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Iowa 1968); DeVeau v. Millis Transportation Co., Inc., 43 F.R.D. 505 (D. Conn.
1967) ; Goldenberg v. Wolfe, 44 F.R.D. 17 (D. Conn. 1967); Cf.
Mahler v. Drake, 43 F.R.D. 1 (D. S.C. 1967). Earlier cases are
collected at 4 Moore 26.16 [3], n. 4.
3. Gangemi v. Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19 (D. Del. 1967); Pruitt v. M/V
Patignies, 42 F.R.D. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Cf. Beal v. Schul, 383
F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1967). Earlier cases are collected at 4 Moore 26.16
[3], n. 4.
4. Citations are collected at 2A Barron and Holtzoff § 647.1 (Wright
ed. 1961).18

The thought recurs that Rule 26, into which we are attempting to fit too large a subject, is not dissimilar to our
hang-up as lawyers with regard to the anachronistic proceedings required in a divorce action. We insist that we go through
the ritual of proving fault with the full panoply of an "adversary procedure" in a divorce matter because we feel that we
must adhere to this standard patterned behavioral conduct.
The question we should ask ourselves is, "why I" Why trans11. Id. at 291.
12. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 968 (1955); 4 A.L.R. Later Case Service 756
(1965); McCurn, Battleground: Liability Insurance and the Rules of Discovery, 1 FORUM 3 (1966); Fournier, PretrialDiscovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 220 (1960).
13. Wood v. Todd Shipyards, 45 F.R.D. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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form into a charade what should be a simple administrative
task of terminating an unsatisfactory marriage contract ?
And this is the question we should ask ourselves in terms
of the discoverability of insurance limits. Why not leave Rule
26 out of it ? Let us simply say as a matter of good policy that
Rule 26 may remain as it is or as it is proposed to be amended
by the advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see below) and stop torturing ourselves with the dialectics of trying to grind the question of insurance coverage
(which really under any logical analysis is not relevant to the
"issues" of the negligence case) into the framework of the
discovery rule.
The recent case of Vollmer v. Szabo, 4 illustrates the kind
of judicial realism and flexibility of which, it is submitted,
we need more. The Ohio Court, noting the conflict in cases
as to discoverability of liability insurance coverage, observed
that the trend appeared to be in favor of permitting discovery
of the coverage, and then went on to an extrapolation of the
Court's reasoning (which is of interest because it is a somewhat different approach to the problem), saying:
This Court is of the opinion that the discovery
by the plaintiff of the defendant's automobile liability insurance is a proper exercise of the discovery
rules. In an automobile case in which insurance is
present, the 'realparty in interest on the defense side
is the insurance company. It is the insurance company which provides counsel for the defense. It is the
insurance company which directs the defense; and
it is the insurance company which normally pays the
cost of the defense and of the judgment, if any. The
extent of the interest of this real party to the litigation is a matter of great concern to the plaintiff. The
non-disclosure of this information represents at best
a tactical interest and advantage of the defense. Permitting disclosure will further the purpose of the
Federal Rules in providing a speedy and just termination of the issues on the merits. It will avoid the
element of surprise which the Federal Rules seek to
eliminate from litigation, and it will further the amicable resolution of the conflicting interests of the
parties. The discovery of liability insurance bears no
14. 46 F.R.D. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
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real relation to the financial condition of the defendant or of his insurance company. It is not an area
of special privacy irrelevant to the litigation. Although the issue of liability insurance does not relate
to the merits of the particular issues of the accident
or collision itself, it does bear a great relation to the
conduct of this litigation. [Emphasis supplied.]'"
The further we progress in legal pragmatism, the more
quickly and the more predictably justice will be done. The
recognition by the Ohio Court that in liability litigation the
insurance company is the real party in interest is a long step
forward toward that legal pragmatism. Such acuity is, regrettably, rare.
Two recent cases, one requiring disclosure and one denying disclosure, serve to point up the semantic shoals which our
courts find themselves tumbled in, trying to resolve the question. Both decisions are, however, gracefully written and
both deserve consideration in the context of this article which,
even though it constitutes a special pleading in favor of allowing discovery, takes note of the fact that other people at
other places and other times as well as today differ.
Let us first look at the case of Muck v. Claflin.'" This
was a case in which the trial judge had required that the
defendant answer questions dealing with the existence and
policy limits as well as the name of the company in her liability
insurance policy. The defendant sued out a writ of mandamus
in the Supreme Court of Kansas to forbid the trial judge from
requiring that answer be given to the questions, (the court
holding initially, incidentally, that mandamus was proper inasmuch as the normal appeal procedures would not have given
relief to the defendant since the policy limits once revealed
would be known forever). The court said:
The decisions concerning the discovery of liability
insurance or policy limits are in irreconcilable conflict. The federal district courts are in conflict on the
question as are the courts of the various states. This
holds true as to the federal district courts of this state
and the district courts of this state.
Judicial precedent will furnish little aid in determin15. Id. at 473.
16. 419 P.2d 1017 (Kan. 1966).
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ing the question. We must look to the statutes relating to the discovery. 7
The court then quoted from the Kansas Statutes, section
60-226 (b) which is essentially the same as Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26 (b), and quoted from Fleming James, Jr.,
Civil Procedure section 6.11, pg. 214 in summarizing some of
the arguments in favor of the discovery:
The only issues to be tried in such an action are
those pertaining to the liability of the insured (e.g.,
negligence, proximate cause, contributory negligence,
extent of injuries). Once this judgment has been obtained, a proceeding against the insurance company
is provided for in most states, and in this proceeding
the facts concerning insurance are admissible on trial
and fully discoverable before trial. Plaintiff, however, wants to know early in the first action whether
there is insurance and what the policy limits are for
two reasons: (1) As a rule a judgment of this kind
is collectible only if there is insurance, and if the
judgment will not be collectible it is usually not worth
while to pursue the action further. (2) The settlement value of the case will usually be very much affected by the fact of insurance and, if there is insurance, by the amount of coverage (policy limits).
These are legitimate reasons from the plaintiff's
point of view. Moreover, the social interest will be
served by the giving of information which will facilitate settlement and enable plaintiff to make an intelligent judgment whether it is worth while to pursue
litigation. Defendant and his insurer seem to have
no legitimate counter-interest in concealment, and indeed the information under discussion is given voluntarily in most cases.1 8
The Kansas court rather tautologically concluded that:
under the guise of liberal construction, we should
not emasculate the discovery rules by permitting
something which never was intended or is not within
the declared objects for which they were adopted.
Neither should expedience or the desire to dispose of
lawsuits be permitted to cause us to lose sight of the
limitations of the discovery rules or boundaries beyond which we should not go.... Information which
17. Id. at 1020.
18. Id. at 1021.
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could have no possible bearing on the determination
of the action on its merits could hardly be within the
rule. It is not intended to supply information for
the personal use of the litigant that has no connection
with the determination of the issues involved in the
action on their merits. There is nothing contained in
the pleadings or in the contention of the parties indicating that information pertaining to insurance or insurance coverage will have anything whatsoever to do
with the trial of any one of the three lawsuits concerned herein. Information of the nature requested
could not be 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'
Whatever advantages the plaintiff might gain
are not advantages which have anything to do with
the presentation of his case at trial and do not lead to
disclosure of the kind of information which is the objective of discovery procedure. We think that to
grant discovery of policy limits would be to unreasonably extend discovery procedure beyond its normal
scope and would not be justified. If this form of discovery is to be allowed, there should be an amendment of the discovery statutes by an authorized body
rather than a change by way of judicial construction.1"
This theme suggesting an amendment of Rule 26 (b) recurs in the judicial decisions denying the discovery. Probably
hardly any judge deciding the matter is unaware of the fact
that factually and "in real life" the existence of liability insurance and the knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of its
limits does materially affect the settlement and trial of negligence cases. To believe otherwise would be extremely naive
and judges, generally, are not that.
Parenthetically, as a comment both on the hyperbole and
the strength of feeling of commentators who have denied the
discovery or urged its denial, they have for some anthropomorphic reason of their own most often protested against the
"emasculation" of Rule 26 (b) by the adoption of the discovery allowance. In a flight of metaphor, one such went even
19. Id. at 1022.
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further. In an article appearing in the Insurance Counsel
0 the author sternly invokes other images:
Journal,"
[T]he discovery processes should not be prostituted under the guise of liberal and broad construction so as to emasculate the rules by permitting something never intended and not within the declared
objects for which they were adopted.2
And again:
[t]he god of procedural expediency should not be
worshipped to such an extent that the god of substantive law and rights will be desecrated."
Now, to grope out of the turgid penumbra of the past and
into the brightly enlightened present, let us pass over to Utah.
The case of Ellis v. Gilbert,28 similarly came on in an interlocutory appeal under Utah practice from an order of the trial
judge requiring the defendant in a personal injury case to
answer questions concerning his insurance coverage. In a
coruscatingly well-reasoned (the writer is prejudiced, of
course) opinion by Chief Justice Crockett, the Utah Supreme
Court said that the trial judge had the right to require the
answers to these interrogatories concerning liability insurance
under Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
is the same as ours. The court said:
It will be noted... that there are two aspects of the
discovery permitted by this rule. The latter one,
which relates to 'testimony' and provides that it is not
objectionable because it would be 'inadmissible at the
trial,' is not a restriction upon the former and broader
inquiry allowed into 'any matter... which is relevant
to the subject matter' of the action.
In considering what is the 'subject matter' of the law
suit we keep in mind that the ultimate objective of
any lawsuit is the determination of the dispute between the parties, and that the earlier and easier this
can be accomplished, with justice to both sides, the
better for all concerned. Whatever helps to attain
that objective is 'relevant' to the lawsuit.
Stopher, Should A Change Be Made In Discovery Rules To Permit Inquiry
As To Limits Of Liability Insurance, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1968).
21. Id. at 54.
22. Id.
23. 429 P.2d 39 (Utah, 1967).
20.
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Any lawyer or judge who is confronted with the duty
of dealing with a claim for personal injuries will
surely agree that there are involved two main aspects
of the problem: The first is whether there is liability;
and the second, of equal or perhaps more importance,
is what is the prospect of actually recovering damages. A candid and forthright approach to the disposition of such a case demands recognition of the
fact that the parties are more concerned with what
money might actually be recovered by the plaintiff,
or saved by the defense, than they are with the mere
obtaining of a paper judgment as to whether there is
or is not liability. The recognition of these facts is
undoubtedly the reason that our rule describes the
scope of inquiry in the broader term: 'the subject
matter of the action,' rather than the more limited
one: the 'issues' to be tried in the case.
Cognate to the thought just expressed is the fact that
among the proper purposes of the proceedings prior
to trial is the exploration of the possibility of resolving the dispute without trial. [This is a good and important point in evaluating the relevancy of insurance coverage to the trial. Reread Rule 16 in the light
of the obligation of the court at the pretrial conference to try and simplify and, if possible, to settle the
case there-Author's note] It seems quite indisputable that the court and counsel should have the
benefit of all the material facts bearing upon both
of the essential aspects of the total lawsuit just mentioned, so that there can be a more realistic and
meaningful discussion concerning any prospect of settlement....
We here observe that neither in the order of the trial
court, nor in this decision, is it postulated that information concerning insurance should be disclosed to
the jury. The reasons for this appear to be that because of their lack of professional training and experience in such matters the jurors might be motivated by improper considerations in resolving the issues. But this should not be true of the judge and the
attorneys. They are presumably conditioned by education, training and experience to render service of a
professional character under a discipline which
should involve a high degree of integrity.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/10
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It is indeed true that the lawyer has an obligation to
discharge his duties of this character in loyalty and
fidelity to the interest of his client. But he also has
over-arching responsibilities of the same nature to
the court as one of its officers, and to the profession
itself, in its duty to serve the public according to the
ideal which is the purpose of all procedure: to seek
the truth and to do justice. It runs contrary to this
purpose and casts an unfavorable reflection upon the
integrity of the court and the attorneys if they must
treat such an essential aspect of the case as the existence of insurance as though it would corrupt the
whole procedure if the lawyers and the court knew
about it.
We do not regard it as an insuperable objection to
the discovery in question that it would violate the defendant's rights as unwarranted intrustion into his
private affairs. There are valid reasons why to inquire into insurance coverage is of a different character than to inquire into his other assets. Of perhaps minor importance, but worthy of noting, is the
fact that insofar as defendant's other assets are concerned, plaintiff may have other means of knowing
something about defendant's financial responsibility,
whereas, insurance is but a special type of resource
the defendant may possess, whose only value is to protect defendant's other assets in persons he might
wrongfully injure.2 4
The Utah court then goes on to the fact that under their
safety responsibility act, the legislature has indicated as a matter of public policy that the public has a right to protection
by insurance from the hazards of injury and destruction on the
highways.
When one is so injured, he becomes in effect a thirdparty beneficiary of the insurance of a wrongdoer
who injures him.
Such policies often have various covenants which are
of no concern to the injured plaintiff, e.g.: relating to
voluntary medical coverage; that the insured must
give notice of an accident; that he must extend cooperation to the company. It is only reasonable that
the plaintiff should have some means of discovering
24. Id. at 40.
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whether a policy exists, and what its provisions are so
he can know whether covenants upon which his rights
may depend are being complied with. This is especially true since the plaintiff charges the defendant
with carelessness in injuring him, and may suspect he
would be careless about other duties.
There are further considerations which we regard as
having some cogency and persuasiveness in support
of the discovery. The court is concerned with the
rights of the parties: the plaintiff and the defendant.
The bare facts of life may as well be faced and reckoned with. If we look behind the facade it is to be
seen that where there is insurance, the company actually takes over, employs counsel, investigates the
case, interviews the witnesses, controls offers of settlement, and in fact, handles the entire matter. Thus
the arguments against discovery concerning insurance are actually made by and for the benefit of the
insurance company rather than of the insured.
Whereas, from the standpoint of the defendant, in
most cases there would be no reason why he would
have any objection to allowing the discovery. In fact,
it may prove advantageous to him, since the likelihood is that it would lessen his individual concern
with the lawsuit, increase the possibility of settlement, and reduce the risk of a judgment in excess of
the policy limits.
Finally, there are some very practical reasons why
the refusal to disclose whether insurance exists seems
like almost useless shadow boxing anyway. Due to
the almost universal carrying of liability insurance
on automobiles because of financial responsibility
acts, there is very little likelihood that the court and
lawyers will think otherwise than that the defendant
is insured. Furthermore, our statute requires a person involved in an automobile accident to file proof of
insurance or financial responsibility, or have his driver's license suspended. This information can be obtained by the parties. Refusal to disclose serves the
cause of neither efficiency nor fairness. It just adds
to the difficulty and delay by forcing the plaintiff to
resort to other sources than court procedure to get
necessary information. However, fairness does suggest taking note of the fact that in actual practice
some insurance companies and their attorneys wilhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/10
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lingly make such disclosure, while others decline to do
so. The position taken by the trial courts puts them
all in equal footing and puts the control in the court
where it belongs."
I have quoted the Ellis case at some length because it is
the kind of case that cuts through the cliches and truisms which
sometimes pass for thought. This kind of pragmatism should
be one of the bases of judicial reasoning if not the most important one. Human experience and the human condition
should be the yardsticks by which any given legal proposition
is measured. Judge Crockett evidences this kind of thinking
in his majority opinion in Ellis.
It might be mentioned tangentially and somewhat off
the subject that a good many of the courts which have refused
divulgence of insurance policy limits have noted that they
feel that the litigants should come into court on an "equal
basis." The irony of this should be apparent even to those
who enunciate this nonsensical proposition. The equality
with which an injured plaintiff approaches litigation with an
insurance company is to say the least unenviable. It would
take another article to discuss this phenomenon but the abuses
of insurance companies in wearing down legitimate claimants
are legion and notorious and one of the abuses is refusal to
reveal policy limits.
There was a dissent in the Ellis case which while somewhat beguiling, illustrates the vacuity (it is submitted) of the
thinking behind the refusal to be realistic about revealing to
the real beneficiary of a liability insurance policy what the
policy is. Justice ilenriod in dissenting says:
If the main opinion stands, there is absolutely no
reason why a plaintiff, who might have a phony claim,
could not require the author of the main opinion, or
anyone else, to open up his safety box and divulge how
green it is. Even the Supreme Court has said something about the right of privacy. A man's contract
is his own, whether it be with his lessor, banker, wife
or insurance company.
The main opinion says that a candid and forthright
approach requires that we recognize that people are
25. Id. at 41.
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more concerned about what money they can recover
than a paper judgment. True, but so were the moneychangers in the Temple more concerned with money
than the Sermon on the Mount. That does not justify the courts in seeing that the money-changers have
an advantage in the courts.
There are thousands of fake suits instituted in this
country. I don't think this is one of them, but if you
lay down a precedent that any tramp, for $17.00, can
force a decent person [sic] to divulge his assets,for the purpose of nudging him into a settlement of
a possible cooked-up case, we and the courts are in
trouble,-and in concluding so we have cooked the
sweet rules of procedure into a bitter brew of 'boil
and bubble, toil and trouble.'28
Q.E.D., say I.
In another but allied realm, let's talk about the discovery
of policy defenses which the insurer might assert.
The same considerations which would dictate revelation
of the existence and limits of a liability policy would similarly
dictate that any policy defenses asserted by the insurance company and known to the insured should be made available to the
plaintiff. Factually, the insurance company is the real party
in interest in a litigation between an insured plaintiff and a
potentially liable insured. This is recognized from the time
the accidents happen: the filing of the SR 21 form (under
Wyoming statutes) ; the assignment of the case for investigation and adjustment; the writing of the customary letter to the
insured advising him of the pending litigation; the expense
of hiring attorneys, discovery, trials, appeal and the multitude of motions all along the way (which insurance company
attorneys seem unusually adept at devising). The insurance
contract, thus, is not merely an indemnity contract but is also
a contract to undertake and to pay for a defense of actions
against the insured. See the recent unreported case of Boston
Insurance Company v. Maddux Well Service.2 7
The injured party, the third party beneficiary under the
insurance contract, if he establishes negligence on the part of
the insured, is thus entitled to know whether there are policy
26. Id. at 43.
27. Civil No. 3767 (Wyo., filed Oct., 1969).
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defenses which might defeat his right of recovery and to know
it at the earliest possible time. This for the apparent reason,
again, that the assertion of such policy defenses would be one
of the factors which would have to be weighed by both defense
counsel and plaintiff's counsel in trying to arrive at a settlement of the case. The courts do not generally look with favor
on insurance company policy defenses which are asserted following a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.2" The courts rather
take the view that when an insurance company undertakes
the defense of an action it may well be estopped to assert at
a later time its non-liability under the policy.
Discovery should also extend, for the purpose of putting
the parties into realistic bargaining positions, to the communication in which the insurance company advses he insured
that it is undertaking the defense of the action. A practice
which is sometimes followed by liability carriers and which in
my view is unconscionable, is to undertake the defense of the
insured but with a "reservation of rights" which means that
the insurance company is saying to its insured that by defending him they are not admitting that he has any insurance with
them. Not only is this practice unfair to the insured since it
gives him a lawyer and very likely an entire theory of the
case which may not be beneficial to him (but which may be
beneficial to the disclaiming insurance company) but it is also
unfair to the plaintiff.
There are probably few cases, if any, in which the plaintiff's attorney does not know whether the opposing attorney
appears because he represents the insurance company or apWhen the
pears because he represents solely the insured.
to
try
the lawthus,
its
attorney,
deputes
insurance company
suit as it normally has the right to do under the contract, there
is a holding out to the plaintiff that there is valid insurance to
cover his loss if he can prove that it was caused by the negligence of the insured. The plaintiff should have complete latitude to find out the details of the contractual obligation between the insured defendant and his insurance company.
This would include any asserted policy defenses.
28. See Phoenix Assurance Company v. Latta, supra note 9.
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THE PROGNOSIS

It is my opinion that if the Wyoming State Supreme
Court were presented today with the question of discoverability of insurance limits under Rule 26, it probably would hold
that the rigidity of the language of the rule is such that the
discovery could not be had. It is further guessed, however,
and my hope would be, that if Rule 26 were amended to conform to the amendment now being offered by the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee our Supreme Court would be willing to adopt the new language and to incorporate it within our
rules. Insofar as this article is concerned, in the preliminary
draft of the proposed amendment to Rule 26 (b) as offered
by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States in November, 1967
is as follows:
(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION DISCOVERY.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as p.e.vided-byRule co0 (b) ;5, (4), th-, dp uerut maty. be examinRed
in accordancewith these rules, the scope of discovery
is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
. -. ,,, party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter F ... t faj.,. It is not
ground for objection that the testimeny information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the Psti
R
inf ormation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(2) InsuranceAgreements. A party may obtain
discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which,any person carrying on
an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/10
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insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure
admissible in evidence at trial.2"

The comments of the Committee on the proposed Rule
26 (b) (2) deserve reprinting:
Subdivision (b) (2)-Insurance Policies. Both
the cases and commentators are sharply in conflict on
the question whether defendant's liability insurance
coverage is subject to discovery in the usual situation
when the insurance coverage is not itself admissible
and does not bear on another issue in the case. Examples of Federal cases requiring disclosure and supporting comments: Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875
(D. D.C. 1966) (cases cited); Johanek v. Aberle, 27
F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Williams, Discovery of
Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile
Tort Cases, 10 Ala. L. Rev. 355 (1958) ; Thode, Some
Reflections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas
Rules, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 33, 40-42 (1958). Examples of
Federal cases refusing disclosure and supporting
comments: Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476
(D. N.J. 1962); Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389
(E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; Frank, Discovery and Insurance
Coverage 1959 Ins. L. J. 281; Fournier, Pre-Trial
Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28
Ford. L. Rev. 215 (1959).
The division in reported cases is close. State
decisions based on provisions similar to the federal
rules are similarly divided. See cases collected in 2A
Barron & Holtzoff, FederalPracticeand Procedure
§ 647.1, nn. 45.5, 45.6 (Wright ed. 1961). It appears
to be difficult if not impossible to obtain appellate
review of the issue. Resolution by rule amendment is
indicated. The question is essentially procedural in
that it bears upon preparation for trial and settlement before trial, and courts confronting the question, however they have decided it, have generally
treated it as procedural and governed by the rules.
The amendment resolves this issue in favor of
disclosure. Most of the decisions denying discovery,
some explicitly, reason from the text of Rule 26 (b)
that it permits discovery only of matters which will
be admissible in evidence or appear reasonably calcu29. 43 F.R.D. 224 (1967).
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lated to lead to such evidence; they avoid considerations of policy, regarding them as foreclosed. See
Bisserier v. Manning, supra. Some note also that
facts about a defendant's financial status are not discoverable as such, prior to judgment with execution
unsatisfied, and fear that, if courts hold insurance
coverage discoverable, they must extend the principle
to other aspect of the defendant's financial status.
The cases favoring disclosure rely heavily on the
practical significance of insurance in the decisions
lawyers make about settlement and trial preparation.
In Clauss v. Danker, 264 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. N.Y.
1967) the court held that the rules forbid disclosure
but called for an amendment to permit it.
Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable
counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation
strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation.
It will conduce to settlement and avoid protracted
litigation in some cases, though in others it may have
an opposite effect. The amendment is limited to insurance coverage, which should be distinguished from
any other facts concerning the defendant's financial
status (1) because insurance is an asset created specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance
company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is available only
from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.
Disclosure is required when the insurer 'may be
liable' on part or all of the judgment. Thus, an insurance company must disclose even when it contests
liability under the policy, and such disclosure does not
constitute a waiver of its claim. It is immaterial
whether the liability is to satisfy the judgment directly or merely to indemnify or reimburse another
after he pays the judgment. The provision applies
only to persons 'carrying on an insurance business'
and thus covers insurance companies and not the ordinary business concern that enters into a contract of
indemnification. Cf. N.Y. Ins. Law, Mek. Consol.
Laws, 0-28, § 41. In no instance does disclosure make
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/10
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the facts concerning insurance coverage admissible
in evidence."0
Procrustes, if you recall, was an antic, Attic thug who
lashed his victims to an iron bed and cut off or stretched the
victim's members as seemed to be indicated to fill the bed.
Thus, the Procrustean bed concept which is significant in
terms of our attempts to chop off or stretch the question of
insurance coverage and limits within the framework of Rule
26. The Committee on the Federal Rules has, (not to labor the
classical allusions too much), cut the Gordian knot which has
been tied ever more tightly by court decisions logically
holding that insurance coverage is not properly discoverable
under Rule 26 (b) as it now exists, but then wistfully saying
by way of dicta that they wish it could be because it would be
a good thing for the jurisprudence and for the litigants if it
were.
We in Wyoming should not await the outcome of the Federal Rules proposal. It is modestly suggested that we should
move forward in the Bar through our Continuing Rules Committee and into our Supreme Court with language which
would be equivalent to the quoted language of the proposed
amendment contained in Rule 26 (b) (2) above. The sooner
the better, I submit, for everyone concerned, including, surprisingly enough, the insurance companies. This may sound
odd, considering the adamantine opposition of insurance companies and their attorneys to the "emasculation" of Rule 26;
but I am not being wholly facetious when I say that the adoption of the new provision would assist the insurance industry
in at least two regards:
First, it would render passe the childish cat and mouse
game played with human pawns by the grown men whom they
hire (as lawyers, adjusters, or what have you). The injured,
the wrongful death heirs, and all the traumatized victims
simply ask to be told whether there is insurance money availto make them whole if some insured negligently has caused
their problem. An unreasonable requestI
Second, it would relieve the insurance company of an increasingly well-founded suspicion that the insurance folks are
S0, 43 F.R.D. 229 (1967).
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taking the same position as the moneylenders did when they
fought the "truth in lending" legislation. You will recall
that these laws were designed only to require that in their business dealings, the lenders tell people the truth. An unreasonable request?
We inevitably approach the day when uniformly, as a matter of good policy, injured parties will be able to find out what
insurance coverage exists in favor of the defendant. Wyoming, a pioneer in some areas, a laggard in others, should as I
posit move ahead now on its own to take this one step to make
the insurance business protect the people it is well paid to protect-its policyholders and its policyholder's victims.
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